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A recent strand of research proposes that sudden jumps in uncertainty generate rapid drops 
and recoveries in real macroeconomic variables that drive the business cycle. Using an 
empirical model, we find substantial heterogeneity in the reactions to these shocks across 
countries. In comparison to the U.S. and other developed countries, emerging economies 
suffer much more severe falls in investment and private consumption following an 
exogenous uncertainty shock, take significantly longer to recover, and do not experience a 
subsequent overshoot in activity. We provide evidence that the dynamics of investment and 
consumption are correlated with the depth of financial markets. Once we control for the 
potential role of credit constraints, we find that investment and consumption dynamics in 
emerging economies are similar to those in developed economies. In this context, monetary 
and fiscal policy actions that alleviate the impact of credit constraints facing firms and 




La literatura reciente propone que un aumento repentino del nivel de incertidumbre genera 
caídas y recuperaciones rápidas en variables macroeconómicas. Estimando un modelo 
empírico, encontramos heterogeneidad entre las reacciones de distintos países frente a estos 
shocks. Frente a un aumento repentino de la incertidumbre, las economías emergentes 
sufren caídas mayores en inversión y consumo privado que los países desarrollados, se 
demoran más en recuperarse, y no experimenten un sobrerreacción posterior en la 
actividad. Encontramos evidencia de que la dinámica de la inversión y el consumo está 
correlacionada con la profundidad del mercado financiero local. Cuando controlamos por el 
potencial rol del canal del crédito, encontramos que la dinámica de la inversión y el 
consumo en los mercados emergentes es parecida a la de los países desarrollados. Dados 
nuestros resultados, una intervención monetaria o fiscal dirigida a contrarrestar el impacto 
de las restricciones del crédito que enfrenten los agentes económicos podrían reducir el 
impacto de la incertidumbre global sobre las economías emergentes. 
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Sudden changes to the level of aggregate uncertainty facing economic agents has been shown
to be an important shock driving the U.S. business cycle. Using a simple reduced-form VAR,
Bloom (2009) estimates that U.S. industrial production is reduced by approximately 1 per-
cent in response to an uncertainty shock. The initial drop is followed by a swift recovery and
subsequent overshoot in production that surpasses its trend by approximately one percent.
Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010) ﬁnd that similar dynamics are observed in a group
of high-income OECD countries following spikes in global uncertainty. The main purpose
of this paper is to examine to what extent these ﬁndings generalize to a broader group of
countries.
In this paper we address whether the rapid drop and rebound of macroeconomic variables
in response to uncertainty shocks in developed economies is also a regularity for emerging
market economies. In particular, we compare the behavior of investment and private con-
sumption in response to global uncertainty shocks in developed and emerging economies
using an open-economy VAR approach. Our global uncertainty shock corresponds to strong
increases in U.S. stock market volatility, and we also employ a measure of local uncertainty
shocks for a smaller group of emerging economies in order to check the robustness of our
ﬁndings.
The evidence we present for a large group of developed economies is consistent with the
literature.1 In particular, there is a rapid drop and rebound in investment following an
uncertainty shock, while private consumption remains almost unchanged. These dynamics
are consistent with the predictions of a model with ﬁxed investment costs that generate a
real-option value of waiting under uncertainty as stressed by Bloom (2009). In contrast, the
evidence we present for emerging markets indicates that these economies suﬀer a much more
severe fall in investment and that this fall is considerably more persistent. We also observe
a signiﬁcant fall in private consumption following global uncertainty shocks, in contrast to
developed economies where consumption does not deviate from its trend throughout the
event.
It has been proposed that uncertainty generates reductions in real activity since at least
Keynes (1937), who suggested that investment is the most volatile component of aggregate
demand precisely because it relies most heavily on opinions about future events, which are
necessarily ill-informed. Building on work by Weisbrod (1964) and Arrow and Fischer (1974),
Bernanke (1983) formalized the idea that, when projects are irreversible and information
is made available over time, the presence of uncertainty about future returns generates an
1See Bloom (2009) for evidence estimated for the U.S., and Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010) for a
group of ﬁve OECD countries.
1option value of waiting that lowers the rate of current investment, even when agents are risk-
neutral.2 Recent work on the topic has made progress on modelling the eﬀects of uncertainty,
on verifying the predictions of the theoretical models with their empirical counterparts, and
on estimating the economic signiﬁcance of the mechanism.
In models of investment with ﬁxed adjustment costs, such as Bloom (2009), the region
of inaction – in which ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal not to adjust their input levels – varies according
to the level of time-varying uncertainty. In periods of high uncertainty, more ﬁrms choose
to “wait-and-see”, putting their investments on hold voluntarily. When uncertainty dissi-
pates and business conditions can be better ascertained, ﬁrms who postponed their factor
adjustments ﬁnd themselves far from their optimal levels of capital and labor, and thus carry
out the corresponding adjustment to relieve their pent-up factor demand. This generates a
rapid recovery and overshoot from the original trend levels of macro variables. This mod-
elling approach predicts that a given ﬁscal or monetary policy intervention will have less
impact during periods of high uncertainty.
A number of candidate explanations are available to account for the heterogeneity in
responses we observe across countries, which lead to very diﬀerent policy prescriptions in the
face of uncertainty shocks. While the model described above could be calibrated according to
local depreciation and discount rates, the evidence from emerging market economies suggests
that other factors may need to be taken into account to fully characterize the response of real
activity to uncertainty shocks. These may include credit constraints for ﬁrms and households
that arise due to characteristics of local ﬁnancial markets. We explore several alternative
mechanisms using a cross-sectional approach in order to shed light on the heterogeneity in
response dynamics, but do not oﬀer conclusive evidence in this paper. We document that
the amplitude of the fall in investment and private consumption for the group of countries
in our sample is correlated with GDP-per-capita, the depth of local ﬁnancial markets, an
index of business-related institutional quality, and the degree of ﬁnancial dollarization.
Based on our ﬁndings, we conduct a counterfactual exercise to gauge the magnifying
role of the credit channel. We ﬁnd that the contraction in credit loans in emerging markets
following uncertainty shocks can account for approximately one-third of the drop in invest-
ment. Interestingly, the persistence of the drop in investment and the lack of a subsequent
overshoot are both explained in large part by the persistent drop in credit. In other words,
when we shut oﬀ the endogenous response of credit to the uncertainty shock, we observe that
investment and consumption dynamics in emerging market economies are similar to those
in developed economies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the data used in the paper and
2See Pindyck (1991) and Dixit (1992) for an overview of the implications of irreversibility on investment
under uncertainty.
2discuss our deﬁnition of a global uncertainty shock. In section 3 we describe our method-
ological approach, and state the econometric model we will estimate. In section 4 we present
the results of our estimations, examine the heterogeneity in the response functions across
countries using plausibly relevant variables, and discuss the policy implications of each in-
terpretation. We then conduct sensitivity analysis using a measure of local uncertainty to
ensure that our results are not driven by the use of a global indicator of uncertainty. Section
5 concludes.
2D a t a
While the idea that uncertainty is an important determinant of the business cycle has been
acknowledged since Keynes (1937), its incorporation into modern models of the business
cycle was delayed due to its intangible nature. There has been disagreement as to what,
exactly, “uncertainty” corresponds to, and what its empirical counterpart should be. In
an important contribution, Bloom (2009) showed that measures of stock-market volatility
are strongly correlated with other measures of both micro- and macro-level uncertainty,
including bond spreads, disagreement among professional forecasters, and the distributions
of ﬁrm proﬁts and industry productivity growth.3 This has motivated the use of volatility
in stock market options as a measure of implied aggregate uncertainty.
In measuring uncertainty for a panel of countries, it is unclear whether the relevant
measure is a local indicator of volatility, or a common global shock that would aﬀect all
economies exogenously. Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010) ﬁnd that country-level risk
indices constructed using local ﬁnancial indicators are highly correlated across countries.
Given this extensive co-movement, they use the mean of their country-level indices as a
common measure of global uncertainty in their analysis.
Since reliable high-frequency domestic series are not always available for emerging market
countries, a measure built using averages of these domestic series would be susceptible to
changes in the sample of countries included. It is also debatable to what extent stock
market indices are an adequate measure of local business conditions in an emerging economy,
especially during the 1990s when market capitalization was low relative to GDP and very few
ﬁrms sought ﬁnancing in local stock markets. For this reason, we choose to use a single series
to identify global shocks in our core analysis, and conduct a sensitivity exercise in section
4.4 to test whether our results are robust to using uncertainty series built with domestic
ﬁnancial variables for emerging markets.
3Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007) had previously shown that share return volatility is correlated
with ﬁrm-level uncertainty in the United Kingdom.
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Source: Authors’ calculations using methodology from Bloom (2009) and data from Bloomberg.
We begin by constructing a volatility index equal to the annualized standard deviation of
daily returns in the S&P 500 30-day future options market over a calendar month, deﬁned as
xt. We then implement the identiﬁcation methodology presented in Bloom (2009), identifying
global uncertainty shocks as periods of high volatility in the series xt, which is graphed for
our analysis period in ﬁgure 1.
Uncertainty shocks are identiﬁed as observations that are 1.65 standard deviations above
the Hodrick-Prescott trend value of the index, and correspond to the areas shaded in light
blue. Six events that ﬁt this criteria are identiﬁed in our sample period, and each can be
clearly associated with an important geopolitical or ﬁnancial event that can be considered
exogenous to local macroeconomic fundamentals.4 The persistently high volatility following
4Interestingly, many of the events identiﬁed as uncertainty shocks using this criteria coincide with those
listed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) as episodes of increased Knightian uncertainty that generate
a ﬂight to quality.
4the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has increased the standard deviation of the series as a whole, such
that not all events reported by Bloom (2009) are identiﬁed as shock episodes even though
we employ the same identiﬁcation criteria. In particular, the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis is
no longer considered a global uncertainty shock in our analysis.
The events are weighted according to the magnitude of the volatility shock, making
the results comparable across countries even though the events under consideration diﬀer
according to the length of each sample. When volatility remains high for more than one
quarter, as is the case in the Worldcom/Enron scandals of 2002 and the global ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008–09, the vol∗
t variable maintains a positive value until volatility drops below






0i f xt < threshold,
xt if xt >= threshold.
The quarterly series is then constructed as the arithmetic mean across underlying months.
Local macroeconomic variables are from the quarterly national accounts reported by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary
Fund’s International Financial Statistics, and in some cases are supplemented by information
from national central banks. Series reported in volumes are used when available, and we
deﬂate nominal series using the national consumer price index to obtain constant-price series
in the remaining cases. All series are seasonally adjusted using the X-12-ARIMA routine
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.5
The full list of countries included in our analysis is displayed in table 1. All the countries
in our core sample have complete data for the period of 1990:1 to 2010:1. We use a common
sample period to ensure that results are comparable across countries, since the shock we are
considering is common to all countries and the structure of the international ﬁnancial system
has changed substantially over time. Countries in the extended sample, for which we have
data starting between 1991:1 and 1997:1, are included later as robustness checks and in the
cross-section correlation exercises.
5While most series appear stationary in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, this transformation is particularly important
in the estimation of the model for countries that have undergone periods of very high inﬂation, such as
Argentina, Mexico and Peru.
5Table 1: Sample of Countries
Developed Emerging
Core sample (1990:1 to 2010:1)
Australia Japan Chile
Austria Netherlands Hong Kong
Canada New Zealand Mexico
Denmark Norway Philippines
Finland Switzerland South Africa
France United Kingdom South Korea
Italy United States Turkey












We use a standard speciﬁcation for the reduced-form vector autoregression that incorporates
exogenous shocks, prices and real variables. The full set of variables included in the VAR for
each country are: the cyclical component of the S&P-500 index, ˜ sp∗
t; the weighted uncertainty
shock indicator, vol∗
t; the cyclical deviation of consumer price inﬂation, ˜ πt; and the cyclical
deviations of real investment and consumption. Two lags of each variable are included, and
all data are at a quarterly frequency.
6The reduced-form VAR model we estimate can be written as:
˜ sp
∗
t = ρ1 ˜ sp
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where β3,...,β5,γ3,...,γ5 are vectors of parameters, Zt = { ˜ sp∗
t,vol ∗
t} is a vector of exogenous
shocks, and Xt = {˜ πt, ˜ It, ˜ Ct} is a vector of endogenous variables.
The inclusion of the stock market index is meant to control for ﬁrst-moment shocks to
returns, such that our analysis of shocks to εvol∗
t can be interpreted as the impact of the
uncertainty shocks alone. The ﬁrst two variables are exogenous to the local economy, as
would be the case for a small open economy. For our estimation of the United States, we
relax equation (1) and allow the stock market to be aﬀected by lags of the endogenous vector
Xt.
The VAR model given by equations (1) through (5) is estimated by maximum likelihood
for each of the countries in our sample. We then compute the impulse-response matrix Φi and
its orthogonalized counterpart Θi using a Cholesky decomposition of the matrix ˆ Σ, which
contains estimates of the contemporaneous covariance between the reduced-form error terms.
In the familiar notation employed by L¨ utkepohl (2006), the orthogonalized impulse-response
functions are given by
Θi = Φi · P, where ˆ Σ = PP
 .
The ordering of variables in the recursive structure is the same as reported in equations
(1) through (5). As in Bloom (2009), our main identifying assumption is that, once we
have controlled for stock market levels, the uncertainty shocks are completely exogenous to
the rest of the variables. As discussed in section 2, the series corresponds to spikes in the
volatility of daily stock market returns of the S&P 500 index. While it may be argued that
the continuous volatility series depends on stock market levels, and thus on other measures
of economic activity, the shocks to this series shown in ﬁgure 1 can often be associated with
important geopolitical events, and are thus exogenous even to the U.S. economy.
The magnitude of the shock to εvol∗
t is equal to the mean value of xt over all episodes in
our sample. The response functions have been normalized to percentage units such that the
plots in ﬁgures 2, 3 and 5 can be interpreted as the response variable’s deviation from trend
in percentage points following a volatility shock of average magnitude.
































We estimate the model separately for each of the countries listed in table 1. Figure 2 displays
the orthogonalized impulse response functions for investment in Chile and the United States
following a shock to global uncertainty, with one-standard-deviation conﬁdence intervals
shaded in blue. While the U.S. reaction is consistent with the results in Bloom (2009) and
Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010) – displaying a rapid drop, rebound, and overshoot
– the Chilean case displays strikingly diﬀerent characteristics. First, the amplitude of the
drop in investment is three times as large. Second, investment takes considerably longer to
return to its trend level, indicating that the eﬀect of the uncertainty shock is more persistent.
Third, the response of investment in emerging markets displays no subsequent overshoot.
To generalize our ﬁndings, we group the countries by their World Bank income classiﬁca-
tion at the beginning of the sample period (1990), where the “developed” group corresponds
to high-income countries and the “emerging” group to countries with low- and middle-income
designations (World Bank, 1990). Figure 3 plots the median impulse response functions for
the group of emerging market economies and for the group of developed countries.6 Panel
6The value of the median IRF in step i is deﬁned as the median across all IRFs in step i, and does not
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A reports the response of investment. The response for developed countries is consistent
with the response estimated for the United States, displaying a rapid drop and rebound in
investment. The group of emerging economies suﬀers a much more severe fall in investment
following the global uncertainty shock, the median gap falling by three times the fall experi-
enced in developed economies. This result is consistent with Lane’s (2003) ﬁnding that the
business cycle in emerging markets is considerably more volatile than in wealthier countries.
We also observe considerable heterogeneity in the persistence of the shock across countries.
On average, emerging markets take substantially longer to recover to their pre-shock trend,
and display no subsequent volatility overshoot.
Panel B shows the response functions for private consumption. While consumers in
developed countries are able to smooth their consumption and thus avoid a drop in utility
due to the uncertainty shock, private consumption in emerging markets falls substantially and
persistently. Possible explanations for this diﬀerence are a constraint on consumer access to
ﬁnancial markets, or to diﬀerences in the social safety nets in place in each country. The drop
in private consumption is consistent with Bernanke (1983), who argues that consumption
in durable goods should fall along with business ﬁxed investment during periods of high
uncertainty, since it is subject to a similar degree of irreversibility that would lead agents
correspond to the IRF of a single representative country. For this reason, aggregate IRFs are shown without
conﬁdence intervals. Medians are used as our measure of central tendency to ensure that results are not
inﬂuenced by the presence of outliers.
9to postpone their purchasing decisions until uncertainty had subsided.7 The fall in private
consumption observed in emerging economies signals that consumers are likely suﬀering a
transitory loss of welfare as a result of the uncertainty shock.
4.2 Potential explanatory channels and their policy implications
In models that feature ﬁxed adjustment costs and an option-value of waiting mechanism,
ﬁrms reduce their investment voluntarily during a period of increased uncertainty as their
region of optimal inaction widens. The contraction is independent of changes in the expected
value of future demand, and takes place even when ﬁrms are risk neutral. An implication,
which has been explored since Dixit (1992), is that ﬁrms are less responsive to a given
change in demand or cost conditions during periods of high uncertainty. Bloom, Bond and
Van Reenen (2007) employ a panel of British ﬁrm-level data to estimate the degree to which
aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty reduce the responsiveness of investment to demand
shocks. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the fourth quartile of uncertainty are half as responsive as
those in the ﬁrst quartile, suggesting that the eﬀect of uncertainty is of ﬁrst-order importance
to the ﬁrm’s investment decision. This leads to the conclusion that both monetary and ﬁscal
policy interventions are ineﬀective at maintaining rates of investment during episodes of high
uncertainty.
But can this class of models be calibrated to generate the observed heterogeneity across
countries that we have reported above? The value of waiting is inﬂuenced by the size of the
ﬁxed cost associated with investing – or, equivalently, the degree of irreversibility of capital
– faced by ﬁrms, which is likely to vary across countries. Pindyck (1991) discusses how the
degree of irreversibility in an economy is determined in part by the market environment, such
as regulations on capital mobility and the risk of expropriation. The sunk costs associated
with ﬁling lengthy paperwork and overcoming bureaucracy also increase the irreversibility of
projects. Countries with regulatory frameworks that make investments less reversible should
thus generate larger real-option values to waiting during periods of uncertainty, and thus
suﬀer deeper recessions.
Another parameter that determines the value of waiting in the model is the stochastic
discount factor that ﬁrms use to discount future proﬁts. When the future is heavily dis-
counted, the value of putting oﬀ current projects in order to wait for stability to return
goes down, and ﬁrms will be more likely to go ahead with projects despite high levels of
uncertainty. Cross-country diﬀerences in discount rates could thus account for some of the
7Carri` ere-Swallow and Medel (2011) carry out a sectorial analysis for Chile and conﬁrm that the fall in
private consumption following an uncertainty shock is due to a very large fall in consumption of durable
goods.
10variability in amplitude.8
While these parameters can help describe the heterogeneity in amplitude, they cannot
directly account for the slow rate of recovery or for the absence of an overshoot in the
medium-run. The real-options mechanism generates a fall in investment in response to
increased uncertainty by widening the region of inaction, and subsequent recovery to trend
once the uncertainty returns to normal levels. In Bloom (2009), the overshoot estimated
for the U.S. economy is modelled using a separate mechanism. The increased volatility
following the uncertainty shock, when combined with a positive rate of depreciation, skews
the distribution of ﬁrms in capital-to-productivity space, creating a glut of ﬁrms on the
edge of their inaction regions that initiate investment projects once the level of uncertainty
has fallen back to normal levels. This “volatility overshoot” generates a positive response
in the medium-term, and once uncertainty has fallen suﬃciently, is enough to generate the
overshoot in the reaction function. The shape of the impulse response function for emerging
markets is similar to that reported by Bloom in his decomposition exercise as the result
of the uncertainty channel alone, suggesting that volatility eﬀects might not have the same
eﬀect in emerging markets.
In order to examine the diﬀerences in the investment reaction across countries, we com-
pute for each country the amplitude and duration of each impulse-response function for the
investment gap equation (4) following an orthogonalized shock to εvol∗
t . Then, we correlate
these variables with potentially relevant country characteristics. We deﬁne duration as the
number of quarters it takes to close the investment gap following the shock.9 Amplitude
is deﬁned as the most negative value of the inﬂation gap following the shock. For this ex-
ploratory exercise, we estimate the model for the extended sample of countries – including
those with data start dates up to 1997:1 – in order to increase the number of data points.
Figure 4a shows the negative correlation between the amplitude of the fall in investment
and a country’s GDP-per-capita in 1990, generalizing the ﬁnding that wealthier countries
suﬀer smaller falls in investment following these events.10 Figure 4b plots the amplitude
of the fall in investment versus the World Bank’s Doing Business index of institutional
quality, which measures the degree to which a country’s regulatory framework is friendly
8A real depreciation may increase the amplitude of the fall in investment due to the fact that the import
content of investment is high in some emerging economies, as documented by Burstein, Neves and Rebelo
(2004).
9Since some series converge to zero very slowly but spend many periods at values that are statistically
indistinguishable from zero, we consider the gap closed once it has reached an arbitrary threshold of 20% of
its amplitude.
10See appendix A for corresponding ﬁgures showing correlations with the amplitude of the fall in private
consumption.
11to businesses.11 We consider this variable to be a proxy for the ﬁxed costs or investment
irreversibility in each country, and indeed ﬁnd that countries with lower-quality institutions
experience deeper falls in investment following global uncertainty shocks.
In this analysis we have estimated the responses of investment and private consumption
across countries to a common uncertainty shock. While diﬃcult to measure, it is possible that
the same episode of high global uncertainty may be ampliﬁed by local policy, such that the
level of uncertainty actually perceived by economic agents diﬀers between countries. Pindyck
(1991) warns that “if a goal of macro-economic policy is to stimulate investment, stability
and credibility may be more important than the particular levels of tax rates or interest
rates.” Baker, Bloom and Davis (2011) construct an index of U.S. policy uncertainty using
Google News data on media coverage of related keywords, and estimate that shocks to this
index have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on investment behavior. The sharp falls we observe in EMEs
may be caused by the magniﬁcation of global uncertainty shocks due to a local environment
of elevated policy uncertainty. The sensitivity exercise performed by Bloom (2009) suggests
that the magnitude of the uncertainty shock could account for the amplitude of the fall in
investment, but would also be accompanied by an equally magniﬁed overshoot, which is not
observed in our estimations.12
Unfortunately, the parameters required to improve country-level ﬁt in the adjustment
costs model are diﬃcult to measure, making it diﬃcult to establish to what extent the impact
of the uncertainty shocks are being generated by voluntary reductions in ﬁrm investment, or
by some other mechanism.
An alternative explanation that could account for the diﬀerences in the evolution of
investment after an uncertainty shock is the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. The correlations
presented in ﬁgure 4 indicate that there is some correlation between the amplitude and
certain variables used in the literature to account for credit constraints. As the economy
enters a period of high uncertainty, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain ﬁnancing for
their projects if (i) banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to gauge
the degree of risk involved in the project, (ii) banks are unable to obtain external ﬁnancing
due to a shortage of liquidity or ﬂight-to-quality episode as described by Calvo and Mendoza
(2000), or (iii) ﬁrms suﬀer a drop in their balance sheet – perhaps due to a currency mismatch
and sudden depreciation – which reduces the collateral available to post against new loans.
The fall in the collateral value and/or the deterioration in the ﬁrms’ balance sheets increase
the negative eﬀect of the uncertainty shock in the economy both in terms of the initial fall
but also in terms of the persistence of the drop in investment.
An extensive literature has explored the link between emerging market recessions and the
11Note that a lower score indicates better institutional quality.
12See Bloom (2009), p. 672 for a discussion of this sensitivity exercise.
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13functioning of ﬁnancial markets. Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2011) carry out a compre-
hensive business-cycle analysis of recessions and recoveries for a sample of 45 countries. One
of their ﬁndings is that recessions in emerging market countries are more often accompanied
by ﬁnancial market disruptions than is the case in developed economies. Aizenman and
Powell (2003) show that a weak legal system combined with high information veriﬁcation
costs generates large, ﬁrst-order eﬀects of volatility on production, employment and welfare.
A ﬁrm credit constraint could aﬀect (i) the extensive margin, by reducing ﬁrms’ ability
to maintain operations while postponing proﬁtable projects during the period of uncertainty,
and (ii) the speed at which ﬁrms can satiate pent-up demand once the shock has dissipated,
and thus the duration of the episode. Figure 4c plots the amplitude of the fall in investment
versus a measure of a country’s ﬁnancial depth for the extended sample of countries. As a
proxy of a country’s ﬁnancial depth, we use the mean ratio of private credit to GDP over
the full length of the period under analysis. We ﬁnd that countries with shallower ﬁnancial
markets experience deeper falls in investment following global uncertainty shocks.
C´ espedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) point out that ﬁnancial frictions in emerging mar-
kets, and their interaction with dollarization of liabilities, present an important shock-
ampliﬁcation mechanism that magniﬁes the business cycle in these countries. Figure 4d plots
amplitude versus the degree of dollarization of the country’s outstanding debt, as reported
by Levy Yeyati (2006). Here we ﬁnd that countries indebted in dollars suﬀer deeper falls in
investment following uncertainty shocks, suggesting that transmission of global uncertainty
through exposed creditors, or the balance sheet eﬀects caused by currency devaluations, may
cause an external credit crunch.
If ﬁnancial frictions are in fact responsible for a substantial portion of the impact of
uncertainty on investment, the policy implications are quite diﬀerent to viewing the downturn
as exclusively a voluntary optimal decision to delay investment. If ﬁrms in fact desire to
invest, but are unable to obtain ﬁnancing due to imperfections in the ﬁnancial market, then
liquidity operations by the monetary authority could potentially reduce the amplitude of the
fall and increase the speed of recovery once uncertainty has dissipated.
Interestingly, the duration of the drop in investment is not correlated with any of our
four explanatory candidates. This may not be surprising as we are considering a limited set
of variables to explain the heterogeneity in our simple exercise, and a combination of these
and other structural characteristics are likely responsible for the duration of recoveries.
4.3 The credit channel
As discussed above, a possible ampliﬁcation mechanism (and potentially a source of persis-
tence) for the uncertainty shock is the credit channel. To measure the importance of this
channel, we carry out a counterfactual exercise to answer the question “What would have
14been the impact of the uncertainty shock in emerging markets, if there had been no change
in the ﬂow of credit?” To do so, we employ the methodology proposed by Bernanke, Gertler
and Watson (1997) to identify the direct impact of exogenous shocks to the price of oil in
the presence of an endogenous monetary policy response.
We augment the VAR speciﬁcation with an additional equation to model the dynamic
of the country’s loans by banks, which is assumed to be subject to the external volatility
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where ˜ Bt is the cyclical component of domestic bank loans, and Xt = { ˜ Bt, ˜ πt, ˜ It, ˜ Ct} is the
augmented vector of endogenous variables.
Since long time series for loans are unavailable for many emerging markets, we restrict
our analysis to those countries for which a complete series of comparable data are available
for our sample period. The countries included in this exercise are Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico,
South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, all of whom have data available from 1990:1-2010:1.
It is clear that a reduction in loans after an uncertainty shock could reﬂect a fall in loan
demand, and is therefore indistinguishable from voluntary wait-and-see behavior. Neverthe-
less, shutting oﬀ the dynamics associated with the loans variable gives us an idea of the
quantitative relevance of a potential credit channel and of its eﬀect on investment and con-
sumption dynamics. We begin by estimating the augmented system in reduced form without
imposing any additional constraints, and compute impulse-response functions. Our counter-
factual is constructed by placing restrictions on the matrix of estimated contemporaneous
correlations, ˆ ΣR. By setting all elements in the row and column corresponding to the credit
channel to zero, we simulate an environment where credit does not respond contemporane-
ously to shocks from the other variables in the system. When constructing the restricted
impulse-response matrix, Φ
R
i , we set all components of the vectors ˆ β3 and ˆ γ3 to zero, such
that the cyclical component of credit does not respond to lagged values of other variables.
The counterfactual impulse-response functions are then constructed by multiplying Φ
R
i by
the Cholesky decomposition of ˆ ΣR. By imposing the restrictions after estimating the model,
we ensure that the estimations do not suﬀer from omitted variable bias.
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The results of the exercise are shown in Figure 5. The baseline results - which are very
similar to those reported earlier - are shown by the solid lines, while the counterfactuals are
shown by the dashed lines. Controlling for the credit channel accounts for roughly one-third
of the drop in investment in emerging markets, and drastically changes the dynamics of
the recovery. Not only is the recovery period shortened considerably, but a small overshoot
becomes apparent. On the consumption side, the amplitude is cut in half when we control
for the fall in credit, and the slow convergence to trend is now a rapid recovery followed by
an overshoot of approximately the same magnitude as the initial fall.
These results suggest that the deep, prolonged falls in investment and consumption ob-
served in emerging markets are in large part due to tightening in credit constraints. Once we
hold the ﬂow of credit constant, we observe dynamics that are similar to those in developed
countries, and which are easier to reconcile with Bloom’s (2009) modelling approach. In this
context, ﬁscal and monetary policy actions that soften the credit constraints faced by ﬁrms
and households may be eﬀective to reduce the negative eﬀects of uncertainty in the economy.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
Volatility is highly synchronized across OECD countries due to spillovers between integrated
ﬁnancial markets. As Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2010) point out, this justiﬁes the use
of a common global uncertainty measure. In emerging markets, however, it is possible that
16idiosyncratic or regional events may not perfectly correlate with the U.S. series, such that the
series we have used so far is inadequate for capturing local market uncertainty. For instance,
the Asian Crisis of 1997 and the Tequila Crisis of 1995 had large impacts on real variables
in the Far East and Latin America, respectively, but are not identiﬁed as relevant events
in the U.S. series. It may also be the case that our orthogonalization to U.S. stock market
performance is not eﬀectively separating the eﬀect of uncertainty from local ﬁrst-moment
shocks.
To test the sensitivity of our results to this critique, we use national stock market indices
to identify local uncertainty shocks by applying the same identiﬁcation algorithm as described
in section 2 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South
Korea and Thailand.13 While the Russian and 2008–09 ﬁnancial crises are identiﬁed in all
the local series, the Enron scandal is not identiﬁed as an uncertainty shock in any of them.
Figure 6 shows the local volatility series and identiﬁed shocks in Hong Kong’s Han Sen Index
and Chile’s IPSA index. As expected, the 2007 Asian Crisis ﬁgures prominently as a major
event in Hong Kong, as does the Tequila Crisis of January 1995 in the Chilean market.
We then estimate a modiﬁed version of the VAR model, restructuring the dynamics of
t h es h o c k si nt h ev e c t o rZt such that the local stock market index is no longer isolated from
lagged movements in local macroeconomic activity:




volt = φ1volt−1 + φ2volt−2 + ε
volt
t
The remaining block of endogenous variables is unchanged from equations (3) through
(5). Figure 7 shows the median impulse-response function for the investment gap in the
sample of countries listed above, alongside the same function estimated using the global
uncertainty series and the VAR model speciﬁed in equations (1) through (5). The dynamics
are roughly similar, suggesting that the use of a global series may be suﬃcient for capturing
uncertainty shocks in emerging markets.
We also estimate the model using local shocks identiﬁed using a local volatility series that
has been orthogonalized to remove movements in global uncertainty, using the residuals from
a linear regression of volt on vol∗
t. For the group of countries considered in this subsection, the
results are nearly identical to those reported in ﬁgure 7. This exercise conﬁrms that emerging
market dynamics following local uncertainty shocks are comparable to those following global
uncertainty shocks.
13Since daily market data are not available for the full 1990:1-2010:1 period, sample start dates vary.
17Figure 6: Equity volatility in Hong Kong and Chile
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We have examined to what extent the stylized facts reported in the recent literature on
uncertainty shocks are applicable to a heterogenous group of countries. We identify three
ﬁndings about the impact of a global uncertainty shock: (i) emerging market countries suﬀer
a median fall in investment approximately three times as large as that found in developed
countries; (ii) there is considerable heterogeneity in recovery times between countries but, on
average, the recovery time to such a shock is longer for emerging markets; and (iii) emerging
markets, unlike their developed counterparts, experience a strong fall in private consumption
following the uncertainty shock. In particular, whereas in developed economies there is no
signiﬁcant reaction of private consumption to uncertainty shocks, in emerging economies
there is a large and persistent drop of this variable.
We explore alternative explanations and discuss their policy implications, but our empir-
ical strategy is not equipped to identify the relative importance of each channel in generating
the cross-country heterogeneity. Certain structural parameters in a real-option value model
can be adjusted to account for the cross-country diﬀerences, such as the stochastic discount
factor and the degree of irreversibility of investment. However, identifying these deep param-
eters empirically is diﬃcult and reproducing the degree of heterogeneity we have estimated
would thus involve substantial calibration, with questionable implications for policy.
19We present preliminary evidence that the amplitude of the drop in investment is corre-
lated with the quality of business institutions, the depth of the local ﬁnancial sector, and
the degree of ﬁnancial dollarization. These empirical ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial fric-
tions may have important interactions with the transmission of global uncertainty shocks,
which has implications for the modelling strategy that should be employed to study these
events. We then carry out a counterfactual exercise to examine the importance of the credit
channel, and ﬁnd that contraction in credit loans in emerging markets following uncertainty
shocks can account for approximately one-third of the drop in investment. Interestingly,
the persistence of the drop in investment and the lack of a subsequent overshoot are both
explained in large part by the persistent drop in credit. This suggests that the real options
modelling strategy employed in the literature may be appropriate for modelling the eﬀect of
uncertainty in emerging markets if a credit channel is included.
Disentangling the importance of each of the channels considered in this paper is of primary
relevance to policymakers. The real-option literature of investment under irreversibility and
uncertainty concludes that monetary and ﬁscal policy have very limited eﬀectiveness during
periods of uncertainty. At most, policy should be implemented decisively in order to avoid
aggravating the situation by introducing policy uncertainty. However, if the ampliﬁcations
of a credit friction serve to amplify the fall in investment and stall the recovery, then there
may be an important role for ﬁscal and monetary authorities to increase demand, lower the
cost of ﬁnancing, and provide liquidity to ﬁrms that would seek to invest once uncertainty
has returned to normal levels. In the long run, institutional reforms that serve to reduce
the irreversibility of capital investments, such as capital controls and expropriations, and
frameworks that reduce the discretion of ﬁscal and monetary policymakers, can create a
business environment less prone to “wait-and-see” behavior following global uncertainty
shocks.
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